On the Non-Contractual Nature of Donor-Recipient Interaction in Development Assistance by Murshed, S. Mansoob
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2008 
* The Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, Institute of Social Studies 
(ISS), The Hague, email: Murshed@iss.nl  
This study is a revised version of the paper presented at the 16-17 June 2006 WIDER development 
conference on ‘Aid: Principles, Policies, and Performance’, directed by George Mavrotas. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution to the conference by the Finnish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
UNU-WIDER also acknowledges the financial contributions to the 2006-07 research programme by the 
governments of Australia (AusAID), Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida), 
and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development—DFID). 
ISSN 1810-2611  ISBN 978-92-9230-125-5 
Research Paper No. 2008/71 
 
On the Non-Contractual Nature 
of Donor-Recipient Interaction 
in Development Assistance 
 





This paper analyses three issues in strategic donor-recipient interaction motivated by the 
complexity of the rationale underlying aid. The first is when we have several principals 
with conflicting objectives. Any one principal cannot offer high powered incentives to 
the agent to carry out their designated task. The second is to do with the fact that effort 
associated with ensuring aid effectiveness may concern both principal and agent; the 
optimal solution to which requires difficult to design cooperative behaviour. 
Consequently, the contractual type principal-agent relationship between donors and 
recipients is inappropriate. We need to consider models that signal recipient quality or 
commitment to reform. A simple model of signalling with commitment problems is 
presented, along with extensions to multiple types of agents and time periods, as well as 
possible solutions involving mechanism design.  
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The motivations underlying overseas development assistance are controversial, or at 
least complex. Ostensibly aid is altruistic and meant to help, particularly the poor, in 
developing countries. This may be true of the development assistance granted by the 
Netherlands and Nordic countries, for example. But aid can be, and almost always is, 
motivated by a number of other factors. These include strategic considerations, as well 
as commercial interests. Especially during the cold war, a lot of the United States’ aid 
took the form of explicit military assistance. More generally, a substantial quantity of 
bilateral and even multilateral foreign aid amounted to a side-payment or bribe, mainly 
to the ruling elite in developing countries, aimed at cementing their dependency on 
powerful donors, or at least offering an inducement not to embrace alternative 
ideologies and patrons. Such objectives (see Frey, 1984, as an example of this literature) 
are clearly not aimed at fostering pro-poor growth, and can encourage corruption as in 
Mobutu’s Zaire and Marcos’s Philippines.  
Although the cold war is long over, new security considerations behind aid allocations 
have emerged. A large chunk of the bilateral aid of the United States continues to go to 
Israel, a country with Western European living standards. Commercial interests 
associated with aid are also important, particularly when it involves the sale of military 
equipment (British aid to Tanzania and Indonesia in the 1990s). In summary, models 
that motivate aid as solely emanating from an altruistic desire to eliminate poverty, 
encapsulate only a partial view of reality. The very existence of bilateral aid proves that 
aid is not just about poverty reduction; otherwise it would be optimal to have a single 
global agency managing a common pool of funds, financing an international public 
good, the elimination of poverty (Kanbur, Sandler and Morrison 1999).1  
Analytical models describing donor-recipient strategic interaction should accommodate 
both altruistic and non-altruistic motivations behind aid. Underlying this complexity are 
the many actors in this process with differing aims and objectives. So when a principal-
agent framework is utilized to characterize this behaviour we have to recognize that 
there are many principals and agents. The hallmark of principal agent models is the 
presence of enforceable contractual arrangements, which in the aid business amounts to 
conditionality ensuring aid effectiveness. Enforcing conditionality with sovereign 
recipients is problematic, not least because of post-contractual opportunism.  
That is why we find increasing disenchantment with conditionality amongst aid 
policymakers, who prefer that potential recipients signal their worthiness to receive aid. 
But even this is unlikely to solve the problem, both because of opportunistic behaviour 
by recipients, but also due to the complexity of donor motivation in granting aid, which 
is not just simply confined to poverty reduction. This paper considers three disparate 
models of strategic donor-recipient interaction to highlight problems with 
contractibility, coordination and cheap talk signals of quality. The overarching theme is 
the complex donor motivation behind granting aid, which makes finding solutions to the 
aid effectiveness problem more challenging than when there is only a simple poverty 
alleviation objective. 
                                                 
1 For example, the Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe was administered by a single agency, the OECD. 2 
The analysis of moral hazard and adverse selection in designing aid contracts can be 
found in Azam and Laffont (2003). If aid is conditional on the consumption of the poor, 
it succeeds in alleviating poverty to a larger extent than when it is unconditional. When 
classic adverse selection problems arise, because of the possibility of differing degrees 
of poverty aversion amongst recipients, the conventional result ensues. That is, when 
information is private to the agent, he can exact an information rent. Successful 
delegation to an outside agency can reduce these adverse selection aspects of aid 
allocation, unless the delegated agency colludes with the aid recipient.  
The weakness of the models in the Azam and Laffont (2003) is that they presume 
contractibility in the donor-recipient relationship between sovereign entities, an 
assumption more questionable than viewing all aid as purely altruistic. By contrast, 
Murshed and Sen (1995) analyse a common agency problem, where many principals 
deal with a single aid recipient, as is the case in the DAC (Development Assistance 
Committee) meetings of the OECD. The model is not about designing incentive 
contracts for agents per se; it highlights differences amongst principals. Some donors 
may be more concerned with poverty reduction, compared to others who place a greater 
value on their trade related aid, connected to lucrative military contracts, for example. In 
that case donors with differing views can be made better off by trading their conflicting 
objectives. The model distances itself from the fiction that aid is solely about poverty 
reduction, and it contains an implicit critique of contractability in donor-recipient 
interaction.2  
Svensson (2000) considers a situation when the principal cannot commit to a policy rule 
that rewards/punishes effort/or lack of effort, which is the same thing as saying that 
recipient effort levels are non-contractible. When the donor cannot commit to a policy 
rule or contractual effort levels, it is better off delegating to an outside agency (a 
multilateral like the World Bank) with lower poverty aversion. The assumption that 
multilateral donors can faithfully adhere to their pre-existing commitments is 
unrealistic, given the nature of these organizations, and the disproportionate shareholder 
power of countries like the United States. Svensson (2003) suggests that signals might 
be used to gauge recipient effort and type. When the donor is unable to pre-commit to a 
contract rewarding reform all committed aid gets disbursed resulting in zero reform by 
the agent. If the donor (or its delegate) decides instead to commit its total aid budget to a 
group of recipients, rather than allocating budgets to individual countries, this raises the 
opportunity costs of funds and the donor tends to reward good policies, and competition 
amongst agents reveals more information about agent type.  
The problem with the model is that it does not recognize the fact that very often it is not 
possible to withhold aid from the indigent, even if its government pursued bad policies. 
Torsvik (2005) rightly points out that the donor-recipient relationship is non-
contractual; he models a Nash non-cooperative game. He considers situations where the 
recipient has a first mover advantage, as in a Stackelberg game. By setting transfers that 
                                                 
2   There usually is a plethora of intermediate principals between the ultimate principal and the recipient 
of aid. The electorate in donor countries or their elected representatives may decide upon aid 
allocation, but the actual disbursement is delegated to a domestic aid agency, or a multilateral 
organization such as the World Bank, or a nongovernmental organization (NGO), or consultants. The 
interactions between these different donor agencies and their ultimate principals are more 
appropriately analysed using the principal-agent framework, as these relationships are more 
contractual, see Martens (2002) and Murshed (2003 and 2004) on this.  3 
anticipate donor reactions the agent generates the Samaritan’s dilemma.3 The 
equilibrium reduction in transfers to the poor is substantial, and although there is a sharp 
rise in aid induced by this behaviour, the poor are actually worse off because domestic 
transfers are reduced. This result, however, is not general, nor is it realistic to assume 
that a completely altruistic donor actually exists, even in the Nordic countries. Also, an 
altruistic donor can continue to assist the poor while withdrawing some aid from the 
government.  
Reinhardt’s (2006) model is the closest application of the theory of signalling to the aid 
allocation process. Agents (aid recipients) of different quality send out signals to the 
principal (aid donor). The model considers differential costs of signalling quality by the 
agent, meaning that it will cost a less productive or bad-type agent more to send out a 
signal of high quality than the good type agent who makes better use of aid. She 
concludes that (i) credible signals must be costly; greater than the payoff associated 
with sending no signal whatsoever, and (ii) the cost of a signal to the bad agent must be 
greater than the highest payoff available to him. This will ensure a separating 
equilibrium where pay-offs depend on signals of quality.  
In section 2, I present a model where there are several principals with conflicting 
objectives. The aid business implies far greater complexity than that associated with a 
single principal and agent. We can have many donors dealing with one agent. The 
recipient may face a multiplicity of conflicting tasks. Consequently, one principal 
cannot offer high powered incentives to a single agent to carry out their most favoured 
task. In section 3, I deal with the fact that the moral hazard associated with ensuring aid 
effectiveness may concern both principal and agent;4 the optimal solution which 
requires cooperative behaviour that is difficult to design. Consequently, the contractual-
type relationship that characterizes interaction between principals and agents is 
inappropriate when characterizing interaction that involves sovereign entities, or when 
these relations are fraught with post-contractual opportunism. We need to consider other 
models of strategic behaviour that do not involve contracts, such as those that signal 
recipient characteristics. This is in line with the current fashion favouring recipient 
selectivity in granting aid, and the belief that the PRSP (poverty reduction strategy 
paper) process could signal recipient quality. To this end, a simple model of signalling 
with imperfect commitment is presented, along with extensions to multiple types of 
agent and time periods, as well as solutions involving mechanism design or delegation 
in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
2  Multi-task agents and many principals 
This section attempts to sketch a situation where the agent or recipient of aid, the 
government in a developing country, has several conflicting tasks commissioned by 
different principals. One of these principals is the external aid donor, who wants the 
government to engage in policy reform or carry out other tasks such as increase 
                                                 
3  This occurs when the responses of an altruistic donor who truly cares about poverty reduction is 
manipulated by the recipient.  
4   There is an unfortunate tendency in the literature to ascribe all responsibility for aid mismanagement 
to recipients, ignoring donor culpability in this regard.  4 
investment in the external donor’s favoured sectors and activities. Examples include 
economic structural adjustment, improved ‘governance’, better human rights and the 
adoption of the donor’s values. The other principal reflects domestic constituencies, and 
they too fund the government. Alternatively, they may extend political support to the 
ruling party, which also can be argued to have a pecuniary value. These funds, or the 
pecuniary value of political support, could facilitate the governmental political party’s 
quest for power in a competitive political process. The domestic sponsors of the 
government also want something in return for their funding or support. This could range 
from lucrative business contracts, to protection from international competition, or 
guarantees that an inefficient loss-making public utility is not privatized. The important 
point is that the domestic sponsors of the government may desire something which is at 
variance with the objectives of its external sponsors. Murrell (2002) also considers a 
case when an aid recipient agent interacts with an aid recipient principal (such as the 
government), as well as with a donor agent (aid agency).  
The presence of a multiple-task agent, as demonstrated by Holmström and Milgrom 
(1991), in general yields low-powered incentives to perform any individual task, when 
the various activities of the agent are substitutes as far as the principal’s interests are 
concerned. The Holmström and Milgrom (1991) model considers a situation where a 
single principal deals with an agent carrying out multiple functions. Following a 
simplified version of the set-up in Dixit (2003) we specify a multiple principal, multi-
task framework. Let there be two tasks denoted by x1 and x2 corresponding to 
commissions made by principal 1 and 2 respectively. Each job entails symmetric costly 
effort levels, h, which even if unobservable can be verified from output. I abstract from 
uncertain variations in the agent’s efforts (the influence of luck), agent types and 
intrinsic motivation.  
Principal 1 derives a benefit hx1 for task 1 but none from job 2, and the same in reverse 
applies to principal 2. Note that the benefit rises in the agent’s output, which depends on 
the agent’s effort. The first principal’s profit function, U1 (benefit minus costs) takes the 
following form: 




1 1 1 1 x kx hx hx w wx v hx U + + − − − =    (1) 
In the right-hand side of (1) the first term refers to the benefit from the agent’s effort to 
the principal, the second indicates the agent’s reservation utility (v) which the principal 
must meet. The payment made to the agent is indicated by w, and the payment schedule 
is linear in output (x1) and the effort (h) required per-unit of the task(s). The terms inside 
the square brackets indicate the costs of exerting effort by the agent, which the principal 
must bear. Observe the jointness of effort, which arises because the agent must 
simultaneously carry out both tasks x1 and x2. The last term refers to how one task’s 
efforts affects effort levels in the other. If k is positive then the two tasks are substitutes: 
more effort in one direction implies less effort elsewhere. If k is negative, the two jobs 
are complements. 
The second principal’s profit function by symmetry is: 




1 2 2 2 x kx hx hx w wx v hx U + + − − − =  (2) 
Maximization of (1) with respect to x1 will lead to: 5 
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where,  x1  =  x2= x by symmetry. An identical expression can also be obtained for 
principal 2. Rearrangement in terms of w yields the following marginal payment 
schedule to the agent per unit of output: 




=    (4) 
Payments to the agent are proportional to output (numerator on the right-hand side of 
(4)), but decline due to the joint nature of the tasks undertaken by the agent in the 
denominator.  
Proposition 1: Payments for any one task to the agent decline (or are less high-powered) 
if the two tasks conducted by the agent are substitutes, as efforts in one direction detract 
from the other function.  
Proof. This is apparent, from the term k in the denominator of (4) which lowers payment 
to the agent for each unit of x. Furthermore, it lowers total production of x, as the 
complementarity of the two tasks engenders extra costs and lowers output in connection 
with each of the tasks undertaken by the agent (■).  
Corollary 1: Incentive payments related to effort and output to the agent increase if the 
principals could act together or cooperate.  
Proof. By summing (1) and (2) and then jointly maximizing for x, in the resultant 
expression for w in (4), the term 2 will vanish: 




=    (5) 
(■) 
Corollary 2: Incentive payments to a multi-task agent decline as the number of 
principals increases, because the magnitude of the term 2 in the denominator of   
(4) increases with the number of principals.  
The upshot of this section is that the incentives generated through contractual or 
conditional relations with aid recipients can be largely negated by other countervailing 
tasks and duties of the recipient. 
3  Double moral hazard 
This section considers non-cooperative interaction between the donor and the agent, 
which is not based on a contract between principal and agent. It is usually assumed that 
the recipient of aid is solely responsible for exerting effort that makes aid effective. 
However, the donor, too, can exercise effort aimed at improving aid utilization. This 
may especially apply to the donor’s delegated agencies, such as consultancy firms and 6 
NGOs who also engage in monitoring the use of aid. If effort on the part of both donor 
and recipient is important to aid effectiveness, we have the possibility of double moral 
hazard as analysed in Murshed and Sen (1995), because of the uncoordinated and sub-
optimal effort levels exercised by both parties. 
The donor’s utility is denoted by U and the recipient’s utility is given by V. There are 
two possible states of nature: one more beneficial (B) and the other less so (P). In the 
better state aid utilization is more effective and productive, compared to the other state. 
Their probabilities are defined as π and 1 – π, respectively. The probability of either 
state is in turn affected by an action (a) by the donor, and effort (h) by the recipients. 
These are also the strategic variables in this type of donor-recipient interaction. We 
postulate that the probability of the good state π rises with the input of action and effort 
by both sides, but at diminishing rates. Moreover, these actions and efforts are costly to 
both donor agencies and recipients. 
The expected utility of donors is given by: 
) ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) , ( a C P A U A U h a U
P B − − ⋅ − + = π π  (6) 
where U
B and U
P denote utilities in the better and worse states respectively, weighted by 
the probabilities of the two states. The parameter, A represents more effective aid in the 
good state, A – P stands for less effective aid in the bad state; the utility for the donor 
from the former situation is greater than the latter. C is the cost function of undertaking 
the action, a. Action, a, increases the probability of the good state, π, however, 
undertaking it entails a cost. Also, πa > 0, but πaa < 0. Both Ca > 0 and Caa > 0. 
Turning to aid recipients, their utility is given by: 
) ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) , ( h E P T V T V h a V
P B − − ⋅ − + = π π    (7) 
Again,  V
B and V
P denote utilities in better and worse policy states, respectively, 
weighted by the probabilities of the two states. T is the total aid income obtained by 
recipient government in the better state, and T – P is the lower pay-off during the less 
auspicious state. Even if some individuals are better off in the inferior state of nature 
because they are able to pilfer, in aggregate the recipient government derives higher 
utility from the more beneficial state. E is the cost of effort, h, which increases the 
probability of the superior state, π. Also, πh > 0, but πhh < 0, Eh > 0, and Ehh > 0. 
In the non-cooperative or Cournot-Nash game played by the two sides, each side moves 
simultaneously. The solution to the model involves backward induction given sub-game 
perfection. Each side, therefore, maximizes its own utility function with respect to its 
own choice variable. For the donor it implies maximizing utility, Equation (6), with 
respect to a as shown by: 





a C U U
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π    (8) 
Recipients maximize Equation (7) with respect to h 7 





h E V V
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π    (9) 
Note that in Equations (8) and (9) each side will equate the marginal benefit from their 
own strategy to the corresponding marginal cost.  
It is interesting to consider a counterfactual situation where both sides cooperate or act 
jointly. This will lead to the joint maximization of welfare (W), by summing Equations 
(6) and (7) together. The single grand welfare function when maximized with respect to 
a yields: 







a C V U V U
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π π    (10) 
and with respect to h: 
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Proposition 2: Non-cooperative behaviour leads to sub-optimal effort levels by both 
parties, and inferior use of aid.  
Proof. It is immediately apparent from comparing Equation (8) with Equation (10), and 
Equation (9) with Equation (11), that the levels of both a and h are greater when the two 
parties act together. (■)  
Cooperation is Pareto superior to non-cooperative Cournot-Nash behaviour, as the 
global marginal benefit of both a and h is equated to marginal cost. Note, however, that 
this is entirely infeasible in our present global institutional setting, as there is no entity 
capable of completely overseeing donor and recipient interaction in this fashion.  
4  Signalling commitment to reform 
In many ways signalling quality or commitment by the agent reverses roles in the 
standard principal-agent model. In the latter case, the principal provides a contract to the 
agent, designed to avoid any potential moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
This kind of relation requires an enforceable contract, and the absence of widespread 
post-contractual opportunism. In a signalling game, it is the agent who signals his 
quality, commitment or effort to the principal obviating the need for a contract. For that 
reason, as indicated earlier, the theory of signalling may be more appropriate in 
describing strategic interaction between donor and recipient in the aid business. 
Moreover, we will be concerned with commitment in connection with signalling. Not 
the donor’s commitment to a policy rule, as in Svensson (2003), but the recipient’s 
commitment to reform.  8 
The model proposed below is relevant in characterizing the PRSP process. Implicit 
within a PRSP is a commitment to policy reform by the recipient,5 although other 
requirements such as consultations with stakeholders are also insisted upon by donors. 
Aid disbursement (usually budgetary support) is the quid pro quo for the policy reform 
signal. Commitments can be imperfect, lack credibility, or even become cheap talk (a 
signal lacking commitment). Also, the model that follows is in line with the present-day 
fashion favouring country selectivity over conditionality, when it comes to granting aid.  
The basic setup of the model follows Addison and Murshed (2002). It concerns two 
sides, referred to as the donor and the recipient. Central to the workings of the model is 
the fact that the aid recipient has something to gain from deviating from pre-announced 
commitments. In other words, doing less than the donor wants, in terms of policy 
reform or poverty reduction, for example, either yields a rent or income for the recipient 
government enabling it to spend more on itself and its client groups, or because by not 
implementing policy reforms it avoids domestic political costs. But in order to receive 
aid, it has to commit to the full policy package of reforms.  
Let p represent deviations from the promised reform package. An aid related utility 
function of the recipient (V) could take the form: 
) ( ) 2 / 1 ( 2
2
1
e p p c p c V − + − =     (12) 
where  12 0, , , 0.
e cp p c >≥  
In Equation (12) and what follows the utility functions correspond to expected utilities, 
and a superscript e is used for an expectation of a variable for which information may be 
incomplete. The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (12) is the pure cost of 
reneging on commitments (p) in quadratic form, where c1 is the parameter measuring 
the direct cost of deviations from commitments. The quadratic form of the cost indicates 
that these costs rise more than proportionately as the level of p rises, implying 
increasing aversion to policy deviations. The parameter (1/2) is introduced for 
simplicity. The second term on the right-hand side of (12) indicates gains to the 
recipient from reneging on commitment, or the benefit from a policy ‘surprise’, where 
the level of actual deviation (p) exceeds the level expected by the donor (p
e). In other 
words, the gains from a deviation from policy reform emanate from a surprise; the 
actual value has to exceed its expectation. The parameter c2 can be seen to be a 
subjective measure of the agent’s utility from policy deviations. 
As far as the gains from policy surprises are concerned, it is part of a process of income 
generation for the recipient (y) described as: 
) ( 2
e N p p c y y − + =    (13) 
Here the income of the aid recipient is equal to some fixed amount (y
N) available with 
certainty, plus an additional component arising from policy surprises. The process 
described in (13) is similar to the Lucas aggregate supply relationship.  
                                                 
5   Spending both donor, and domestically generated resources, on the donor’s favoured activities. 
Currently aid is increasingly taking the form of budget support. 9 
Recipients maximize utility in (12) subject to p, leading to: 
1 2 / * c c p =    (14) 
This result can be interpreted in the following manner: the equilibrium choice of policy 
deviation (p*) is greater the higher the element of pure avarice, c2, and the smaller the 
cost of policy deviations, c1. The donor gains nothing from policy deviations, and for 
her it is optimal that p* = p
e = 0. 
Now if we assume that the recipient enjoys a first mover advantage, as is the case with a 
PRSP process, and can announce a policy package where p
e = 0 but actual p ≠ 0. In this 
case the actual and expected policy deviations would be not be equal, and p
 = c2/c1 and 
p
e = 0 in Equation (12). This involves cheating on a pre-announced commitment, and 
the gain from this is: 
1
2
2 2 / ) ( c c V =  (15) 
At this juncture we introduce a simple form of recipient reputation. The donor believes 
the announcement if the recipient acted honestly in the previous period and kept to its 
commitments. Otherwise it is regarded as unreliable. This implies that there is a future 
cost of cheating. Note that I am ruling out the Samaritan’s dilemma (the poor will 
always be aided), because it is difficult to visualize pure altruism even amongst the most 
well-meaning donors. Furthermore, even when the Samaritan’s dilemma is present, it is 
still possible to assist the poor while simultaneously punishing the government by 
withholding some forms of budgetary support. The penalty for cheating (C) is equal to 
the loss of reputation, and the inability to create surprises in the future, given by: 
2
2 1 (( ) /2 ) Ccc =−    (16) 
Hence the penalty for cheating (which is the loss of reputation) appears to exactly equal 
the gain from cheating in (15). But the punishment comes in some future period. If the 
recipient discounts this future loss, the cost of cheating is always less than the gain from 
reneging on a fixed commitment. Typically in many developing countries the future is 
heavily discounted.  
Proposition 3:  The optimal policy of zero policy deviations (p = 0) is incentive 
incompatible, thus it will not be a self-enforcing outcome.  
Proof. The utility in (15) is greater than the cost in (16), provided the latter is discounted 
by a factor, δ < 1. Note that the discount factor, δ = (1/1 + r), where r is an indicator of 
time preference. (■) 
Furthermore, there will be a range of possible policy deviations that are feasible 
equilibrium outcomes, see Addison and Murshed (2002). Hence, multiple equilibria are 
possible. 
Now, consider two further extensions. First, let the donor-recipient interaction extend to 
several time periods; for finite-time interaction this can be encapsulated into a 
two-period framework. Second, let there are be two types of aid recipients. There will 10 
be honest (H) and dishonest (D) types, where the former is more dependable. The donor 
knows that there are two possible types of recipient, but is imperfectly informed about 
their true type. Perceptions about reputation will be inherited from the past and updated 
using Bayes’ rule. The Baysesian priors are common knowledge to both sides. Even 
dishonest groups, operating over a multi-period time horizon, may not misbehave at 
early stages of the game so as to leave their reputation intact for manipulation at later 
stages. A generic objective function for both recipient types can take the following 
form: 





, e e D H p p c p c p p c p c V − + − + − + − = δ    (17) 
Here we have extended the single period utility in (12) to two periods applying a 
discount factor, δ, to weight the future period.  
It is instructive to examine decisionmaking by the two types in the final period of 
analysis. A dishonest (D) type recipient in the second and final period of the game will 
simply choose the level of policy surprise indicated by (14) above. This is because no 
discounting is involved in the last period, and the second term on the right-hand side of 
(17) vanishes with δ = 0. The honest-type maximizes utility (first-term on the right-hand 
side of Equation (17) with respect to two constraints. The first is a dependability 
constraint; the honest type wants to appear to be true to its word: 
) 2 ( ) 2 (
A H p p =    (18) 
where the superscript H stands for the dependable or honest type, H’s announcements or 
offers are indicated by the superscript A, while the 2 in parentheses indicates the second 
period. This constraint states that the actual outcome equals the announcement. The 
other constraint concerns the donor’s beliefs about the type of recipient. The donor 
assigns a probability, γ, that the other side is the honest type and a probability 1 – γ, that 
it is the dishonest type. Its expectation of the level of policy deviation in period 2 will be 
a linear combination of the two strategies weighted by their corresponding probabilities: 
[] 1 2 / )) 2 ( 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( c c p p
A e γ γ − + =    (19) 
Substituting (19) in (17), using (18), δ = 0, and then maximizing with respect to w
H, 
yields: 
[] 1 2 / )) 2 ( 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( c c p p
A H γ − = =    (20) 
Note that the level of policy deviation picked by the H-type in (20) is lower than that 
chosen by the D-type in (14). Observe, however, that even the ‘better’ type of recipient 
engenders policy deviations. Given the uncertainty about agent type, the donor will not 
regard commitments to no policy deviation as a credible offer even from an honest type 
of recipient. Levels of p  chosen in (20) vary proportionately with the poorness of 
equilibrium reputation, (1 – γ(2)). The result in (20) is akin to classic adverse selection 
problems, where the high-risk type exerts a negative externality on the pooled contract 
offered to both risk categories.  11 
 
Proposition 4: If the donor is imperfectly informed about recipient type, then the level 
of policy deviation expected is strictly positive for each type of recipient. 
Proof. This can be seen from (20), only if γ (2) = 1, p
H(2) = p
A (2) = 0, and there is no 
policy deviation. It amounts to perfect information for the donor. If the agent type is not 
known with certainty, policy deviations are positive for both types of aid recipients. (■)  
Corollary 3: The level of policy deviation by the honest type is zero, if and only if, the 
donor is fully informed about the recipient type.  
Proof. As with proposition 4. Otherwise in the presence of uncertainty, donors will use 
Bayes’ law to update prior beliefs about recipient type. (■)  
Let us now move on to consider mechanism design with a view to eliciting information 
about recipient-type and engendering commitment to pre-announced policies. Consider 
a reformulated version of the recipient utility function, ignoring type for the moment, 
where we embed an additional signalling cost component for the agent, which really 
amounts to making cheap talk more costly: 
) ( ) ( ) 2 / 1 ( 3 2
2
1
e e p p c p p c p c V − − − + − =    (21) 
where: . 0 , 0 , 0 3 2 1 ≥ ≥ > c c c   
The last term in (21) can act as a commitment technology for the recipient, and c3 
measures the costs to the recipient of reneging on a pre-announced commitment of no 
policy deviations. Maximizing (21) with respect to p yields the optimum level of p with 
commitment (pc*): 
1 3 2 / ) ( * c c c pc − =    (22) 
Proposition 5:  The introduction of extra costs to cheap talk signals lowers the aid 
recipient’s incentive to engage in these. The choice of policy deviation from the   
pre-announced commitments is lower. 
Proof. Note that equilibrium pc* in (22) is less than p* in (14). (■) 
Corollary 4: With no separation of the type of aid recipient, as long  2 3 c c ≥  (see, also 
Reinhardt 2006) the optimal choice of pc* ≤ 0 for the dishonest type aid recipient.  
Proof. This is because optimal c2 is zero for the better-type aid recipient when the 
mechanism proposed in (21) is in place; he does not want to engage in cheap talk. (■) 
The intuition behind the above is that if the extra signalling cost to both types of agents 
is high, no aid recipient (irrespective of type) will send out cheap talk signals, deciding 
instead to stick to his pre-announced commitment to optimal policy reform. The upshot 
is that the introduction of explicit differential signalling costs leading to revelation of 
agent type may not be necessary with the pooled mechanism design proposed in (21) 
and corollary 4. Without such a mechanism, the revelation of the recipient’s type 12 
continues to matter, and even the more honest type of aid recipient finds it optimal to 
engage in a degree of cheap talk.  
Can we think of real life examples of such a mechanism? One suggestion is donor 
delegation to a multilateral body such as the World Bank, as suggested by Svensson 
(2000). Apart from the fact that bilateral donors who are sovereign powers always 
dislike delegating power, this suggestion could only work if the delegated agency were 
truly independent and above capture by other interests, including its own 
empire-building ambitions. The World Bank or its sister organization, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) cannot be regarded as truly independent, see Mosley (1996). The 
only other alternative mechanism is making the PRSP process even more rigorous, 
which amounts to making the recipient pay for its signal. In reality, it means the aid 
recipient committing sizable resources to optimal poverty reduction policies, and/or 
engaging in costly reforms as part and parcel of the signal. This will also require greater 
commitment to rewarding poverty reduction policies, and not just paying for other 
strategic considerations, on the part of donors. Non-altruistic donors, in particular, must 
respond positively to costly and credible signals of policy reform in connection with 
poverty reduction.  
5 Conclusions 
The main results of the paper may be summarized as follows. The strategic interaction 
between the aid donor and recipient cannot be truly characterized along the lines of 
principal and agent, as the relationship is not completely contractible due to recipient 
sovereignty and post-contractual opportunism. The example given in the paper concerns 
a single agent (aid recipient government) dealing with a donor and a domestic principal, 
each wanting conflicting tasks done by the agent. Neither principal is able to give 
proper incentives to the agent. Therefore, in practice aid donors can only hope to 
achieve partial results, as far as changes in recipient behaviour and donor objectives are 
concerned.  
The interaction between donor and recipient may be better described through simple 
non-cooperative games. In this context, if effort by both sides is important to achieving 
aid effectiveness, there could be double moral hazard. Unless there is better 
coordination, both donor and recipient will exercise sub-optimal effort. No such 
coordinating agency can in reality be thought of; the coordinating role of the World 
Bank in low-income aid receiving countries does not extend to all aspects of aid. This is 
particularly true for politically motivated aid, engendered by strategic considerations 
(the war on terror, for example). However, greater aid effectiveness continues to require 
superior coordination of donor and recipient monitoring efforts. 
Perhaps, the answer lies in characterizing donor-recipient interaction employing models 
where the aid recipient signals his commitment to reform and optimal policies, as is 
desired in the PRSP process. When the recipient has an incentive to signal optimal 
policy without commitment (cheap talk), optimal policies are not self-enforcing. There 
have to be mechanisms that raise the cost of these cheap talk signals to induce optimal 
policy adoption. Mechanism design aimed at engineering commitment technologies to 
optimal policies is problematic, as it may require delegation to third parties or a stronger 
donor commitment to reward costly signals of reform by the aid recipient. This 13 
commitment may be more difficult for non-altruistic bilateral aid donors who donate aid 
based on geo-political strategic considerations. Powerful bilateral donors, like the 
United States, are extremely reluctant to surrender discretionary powers. Nevertheless, 
aid effectiveness requires a stronger commitment to rewarding credible (hence costly) 
signals of the recipient’s commitment to change. 
Finally, we should not rule out the possibility of intrinsic motivation on the part of the 
agent. This is when he actually derives utility from poverty alleviation. This may even 
restore the applicability of principal-agent model in donor-recipient interaction. Also, if 
the removal of global poverty is regarded as an international public good from which we 
all equally benefit, it also raises issues regarding free-riding amongst donors sharing 
these objectives. Ultimately, there should be a single global agency managing poverty 
reduction, and for coordinating donor behaviour.  
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